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How to Improve Empirical Desert 
Adam J. Kolber† 
According to empirical desert advocates, lay moral 
intuitions are consistent with retributive approaches to 
punishment, and policymakers can increase compliance with 
criminal justice policies by punishing in accord with those 
intuitions.  
I offer three challenges to empirical desert intended 
ultimately to strengthen its theoretical underpinnings: First, 
advocates have cherry-picked certain moral intuitions, while 
ignoring others. Second, they have yet to demonstrate the weight 
to assign the compliance induced by empirical desert relative to 
the weight of other consequentialist considerations. Third, 
empirical desert arguably exploits laypeople by using their 
“mistaken” beliefs about punishment to encourage their 
compliance with consequentialist goals. Such exploitation may 
trouble defenders of the “publicity condition,” which requires 
that a system of morality be based on principles that can be 
announced publicly without thereby undermining those same 
principles.  
I do not describe precisely how empirical desert 
advocates should respond to these concerns, but they will make 
substantial headway by more carefully distinguishing the use of 
widely-shared moral intuitions to make predictions about 
people’s behavior from the use of those intuitions to justify 
particular policies. (This article was written for the Brooklyn 
Law School Symposium, “Is Morality Universal, and Should 
the Law Care?”.) 
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INTRODUCTION 
Moral and legal theorists often make claims about our 
widely-shared intuitions. These intuitions are treated like stars 
in the sky. Theorists draw constellations around the stars to 
more or less capture their locations and make the connections 
between them seem sensible, elegant, and sometimes even 
beautiful.  
In one such effort, researchers have sought to 
systematically gather empirical data about our punishment 
intuitions. Paul Robinson, John Darley, and others have argued 
that we share certain deep intuitions about punishment that 
are surprisingly consistent across people of different ages, 
geographies, and cultures.1 Calling the project “empirical 
desert,” these researchers argue that our criminal justice 
policies and practices should reflect our widely-shared 
intuitions. When people see that the law reflects their deep, 
intuitive commitments, they are more likely to recognize its 
legitimacy and comply with its obligations. Most punishment 
theorists have paid little attention to the ways in which 
people’s perceptions of the law’s legitimacy can affect their 
willingness to comply with it. Empirical desert helps to remedy 
this deficiency. 
In this symposium article, however, I offer three 
challenges to empirical desert intended ultimately to 
strengthen its theoretical underpinnings. The first is the 
“cherry-picking” challenge. Although empirical desert purports 
to examine our intuitions objectively, in fact, advocates focus 
only on certain intuitions. In particular, they focus on 
intuitions that are elicited at a particular level of abstraction in 
ways that hide some of our more passionate intuitions that, for 
better or worse, motivate many people. The second is the 
“significance” challenge. I note that empirical desert advocates 
have yet to show how much compliance empirical desert can 
induce. Absent such information, we do not know if there are 
good consequentialist grounds for adopting potentially costly 
empirical desert policies. The third is the “exploitation” 
challenge. Laypeople justify punishment in retributive terms 
  
 1 See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications 
for Criminal Law and Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 8-10 (2007) [hereinafter 
Robinson & Darley, Intuitions of Justice]; infra Part II.A. Of course, lots of intuitions 
do vary by race, gender, and other variables. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & Robert 
Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict in Intuitions of Justice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1829, 
1880-83 (2007) [hereinafter Robinson & Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict]. 
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while empirical desert advocates justify punishment in 
consequentialist terms. One might argue that empirical desert 
exploits laypeople by using their “mistaken” retributive 
intuitions to encourage their compliance with consequentialist 
goals. Such exploitation arguably violates the “publicity 
condition,” which requires that a system of morality be based 
on principles that can be announced publicly without thereby 
undermining those same principles. 
In Part I, I discuss, in general terms, the use of moral 
intuitions to make predictions about people’s behavior and the 
very different use of moral intuitions to justify some policy. In 
Part II, I present the three challenges to empirical desert that I 
just described. I show how empirical desert generally uses 
intuitions in the less controversial predictive mode but 
sometimes slips illicitly into the justificatory mode. By being 
more attuned to the differences between prediction and 
justification, empirical desert can rest on a sturdier foundation. 
I. PREDICTION VS. JUSTIFICATION 
Widely-shared moral intuitions might be thought 
relevant to the law in two different ways. In the “predictive 
mode,” widely-shared moral intuitions help us predict people’s 
likely reactions to laws and other policies that implicate those 
intuitions. For example, if most voters share the intuition that 
it is immoral to use some new military technology, then we 
might plausibly predict that voter support for a war will 
decline if military leaders begin to use the technology. 
Policymakers might decide that, even though the technology 
presents a cost-effective method of achieving military 
objectives, given public sentiment, the war effort would be 
better promoted by refraining from using the new technology 
than by using it. In other words, when engaging in cost-benefit 
analysis, among the many costs to consider are the costs 
associated with taking actions that violate people’s deeply-held 
intuitions.  
In the predictive mode, our widely-shared moral 
intuitions do not justify our actions. Our intuitions merely give 
us information that we can use to better achieve societal goals 
that we have settled on for other reasons. In the previous 
example, opposition to a new military technology tells us 
something about how to prosecute a successful military action, 
even if it tells us little in any deep sense about the morally 
appropriate conditions for using the technology. To the extent 
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that legal theorists and policymakers examine widely-shared 
moral intuitions in the predictive mode, they may well achieve 
their goals. We may disagree about the accuracy of any 
particular predictions said to be rooted in findings about our 
intuitions, but given the ends of the predictive approach, the 
basic methodology is sound.  
A second, more controversial way in which intuitions 
may be relevant to the law occurs in the “justificatory mode.” In 
this mode, we use intuitions not to predict behavior but to 
justify moral claims. We cannot easily or automatically 
determine that some moral intuition is justified, however, 
simply because it is widely held. For example, even if a 
majority of voters believe that it is immoral to permit people of 
the same sex to marry each other, we might resist the idea that 
such intuitions alone, even if they represent a consensus view, 
provide any moral support for prohibiting same-sex marriage. 
On the other hand, widely-shared intuitions may be 
relevant to justification when they fit together with other 
intuitions and with deeper moral principles. For example, most 
people share the intuition that, absent unusual circumstances, 
it is wrong to intentionally kick a sleeping dog. This intuition is 
consistent with many other widely-shared intuitions about the 
impermissibility of causing unnecessary harm. Perhaps we can 
provide some justification for the belief that it is wrong to kick 
a sleeping dog by noting that virtually everyone thinks so and 
that such intuitions cohere with other intuitions and with 
deeper moral principles.  
If morality ultimately depends on empirical facts about 
the world, as many theorists believe,2 then justifications of 
moral claims will likely depend on certain facts about human 
psychology and social interaction, including, perhaps, our 
widely-shared moral intuitions. If facts about our intuitions 
truly are relevant to justification, then the law ought to care 
about those intuitions in order to develop morally appropriate 
laws. Either way, it is much more difficult to make use of 
intuitions in the justificatory mode than in the predictive mode 
because there is considerable disagreement about precisely how 
  
 2 See, e.g., Owen Flanagan, Hagop Sarkissian & David Wong, Naturalizing 
Ethics, in MORAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE EVOLUTION OF MORALITY (Walter Sinnott-
Armstrong ed., 2008); cf. John Mikhail, Universal Moral Grammar: Theory, Evidence, 
and the Future, 11 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 143 (2007) (arguing that we share certain 
fundamental moral intuitions that may, like language, have a largely innate 
grammatical structure). 
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we ought to resolve conflicting intuitions when seeking to 
justify interesting moral claims. As I illustrate in the next 
section, by keeping the distinction clear between the predictive 
mode and the justificatory mode, we can better understand 
what it is that empirical desert advocates are trying to do.  
II. CHALLENGES TO EMPIRICAL DESERT 
A. Empirical Desert Overview 
1. Two Consistent Findings 
Advocates of empirical desert advance two claims in 
particular about lay punishment intuitions. First, they argue 
that lay punishment intuitions are best explained by the view 
that offenders should be punished according to their desert. 
According to Paul Robinson and Robert Kurzban, “empirical 
studies confirm a nearly universal human intuition that 
serious wrongdoing deserves punishment.”3 Desert 
considerations purportedly have much more impact on lay 
punishment intuitions than considerations about deterring 
future crime and incapacitating dangerous people.4 In more 
theoretical terms, empirical desert advocates say that lay 
intuitions are better explained by retributive rather than 
consequentialist punishment principles.5  
Second, advocates claim that laypeople have 
surprisingly consistent intuitions about the ordinal ranking of 
the gravity of crimes.6 Laypeople seek to punish murderers 
more than burglars and burglars more than prostitutes. While 
laypeople may not agree on the appropriate sentence for 
burglary in absolute terms, they will frequently agree on the 
relative seriousness of burglary compared to other common 
  
 3 Robinson & Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict, supra note 1, at 1848. 
 4 See, e.g., Kevin M. Carlsmith, John M. Darley & Paul H. Robinson, Why Do 
We Punish? Deterrence and Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 83 J. PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 284, 295-97 (2002). 
 5 Id. at 296-97; see also Kevin M. Carlsmith, On Justifying Punishment: The 
Discrepancy Between Words and Actions, 21 SOC. JUST. RES. 119 (2008); Kevin M. 
Carlsmith & Avani Mehta Sood, The Fine Line Between Interrogation and Retribution, 
45 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 191, 195 (2009) (providing some evidence that our 
intuitions about the use of harsh interrogation tactics are also largely retributive). 
 6 See Robinson & Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict, supra note 1, at 1856-
61. 
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crimes.7 These intuitions also appear to be cross-cultural.8 
Robinson and Kurzban think the evidence of cross-cultural 
consistency “support[s] the view that people everywhere share 
intuitions of justice about the relative blameworthiness of 
serious wrongdoing.”9 Even young children have proportional 
punishment intuitions.10 Thus, like most retributivist theorists, 
laypeople seem to believe both that punishment should be 
distributed to those who deserve it and that it should be 
distributed in proportion to an offender’s blameworthiness.  
2. The Compliance Claim 
The preceding results are interesting in their own right 
as findings about human psychology. They enter current 
debates about sentencing policy, however, by way of an 
additional claim prominently made by Paul Robinson and John 
Darley. I call it the “compliance claim.” According to Robinson 
and Darley, a theory of punishment distribution “that tracks 
the community’s perceived principles of justice has a greater 
power to gain compliance with society’s rules of lawful 
conduct.”11 In other words, they suggest, if people find a legal 
regime to be just, then they are more likely to comply with it.12 
Moreover, people are more likely to tolerate deviations from 
  
 7 See Paul H. Robinson, Empirical Desert, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 
29, 33 (Paul H. Robinson, Stephen P. Garvey & Kimberly Ferzan eds., 2009) 
[hereinafter Robinson, Empirical Desert] (“The level of agreement is strongest for those 
core wrongs with which the criminal law primarily concerns itself—physical 
aggression, taking property, and deception in exchanges—and becomes less pronounced 
as the nature of the offenses moves further from the core of wrongdoing.”). 
 8 See Robinson & Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict, supra note 1, at 1862-
65. 
 9 Id. at 1862. 
 10 Norman J. Finkel, Marsha B. Liss & Virginia R. Moran, Equal or 
Proportionate Justice for Accessories? Children’s Pearls of Proportionate Wisdom, 18 J. 
APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 229, 241 (1997) (finding that “by grades 2-3, 
[children] are making proportionate judgments of culpability and handing out 
proportionate punishments to all defendants” in mock scenarios). 
 11 Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. 
REV. 453, 474 (1997) [hereinafter Robinson & Darley, Utility of Desert]. H.L.A. Hart 
made a similar point in H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY 36-37 (1963) 
(“There are many reasons why we might wish the legal gradation of the seriousness of 
crimes, expressed in its scale of punishments, not to conflict with common estimates of 
their comparative wickedness. One reason is that such a conflict is undesirable on 
simple utilitarian grounds: it might either confuse moral judgments or bring the law 
into disrepute, or both.”). 
 12 See Robinson & Darley, Intuitions of Justice, supra note 1, at 25-28. 
Robinson and Darley cite, in particular, the work of Tom Tyler. See TOM R. TYLER, 
WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 57-68, 170-173 (2006). 
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their expectations of how the criminal justice system should 
work when they believe that the system, as a general matter, is 
consistent with their intuitions. According to Robinson and 
Darley, “the criminal law can only hope to . . . have people 
follow its rules in ambiguous cases if it has earned a reputation 
as an institution whose focus is morally condemnable conduct 
and is seen as giving reliable statements of what is and is not 
truly condemnable.”13  
Robinson and Darley defend a set of punishment 
practices based on a view they call “empirical desert.” 
According to this view, we should arrange our criminal laws 
and sentencing policies to reflect the intuitions of laypeople.14 
By so doing, we will reduce criminal behavior by encouraging 
compliance with laws that are perceived as fair and just. If the 
law “develop[s] a reputation as a reliable statement of existing 
norms, people will be willing to defer to its moral authority in 
cases where there exists some ambiguity as to the 
wrongfulness of the contemplated conduct.”15 For these reasons, 
Robinson and Darley have argued that investigation into our 
moral intuitions should play an important role in the formation 
of criminal justice policies.16  
Interestingly, the argument in favor of empirical desert 
is consequentialist.17 Robinson and Darley defend empirical 
desert on the ground that it will promote compliance with the 
law, not on the ground that doing so is a deontologically 
justified approach to punishment.18 In fact, they acknowledge 
  
 13 Robinson & Darley, Utility of Desert, supra note 11, at 477; see also Paul H. 
Robinson, Competing Conceptions of Modern Desert: Vengeful, Deontological, and 
Empirical, 67 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 145, 153 (2008) [hereinafter Robinson, Competing 
Conceptions] (“Liability and punishment rules that deviate from a community’s shared 
intuitions of justice undercut” the law’s reputation “for accurately assessing from the 
community’s view what does and does not deserve moral condemnation.”). 
 14 See Robinson, Competing Conceptions, supra note 13, at 149.  
 15 Robinson & Darley, Utility of Desert, supra note 11, at 474. 
 16 Robinson & Darley, Intuitions of Justice, supra note 1, at 4. 
 17 See Robinson & Darley, Utility of Desert, supra note 11, at 456. 
 18 Robinson, Empirical Desert, supra note 7, at 29 (“[P]eople’s shared 
intuitions about justice are not justice, in a transcendent sense. People’s shared 
intuitions can be wrong.”). In their early writing on empirical desert, Robinson and 
Darley may have suggested that community intuitions do bear on deontological 
justification. See Kenneth W. Simons, The Relevance of Community Values to Just 
Deserts: Criminal Law, Punishment Rationales, and Democracy, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
635, 638 n.14 (2000). Ken Simons notes that community values are at least indirectly 
related to deontological justification “[b]ecause our knowledge of moral principles is 
fallible” and “modesty counsels in favor of respecting lay opinions.” Id. at 640. Overall, 
though, Simons finds that the “relevance of community views to retributive principles 
is complex and uncertain.” Id.  
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quite straightforwardly that their “arguments for a desert-
based system are blatantly utilitarian.”19 Thus, Robinson and 
Darley make use of empirical findings about moral intuitions in 
the predictive mode. They use widely-shared moral intuitions 
to predict and, perhaps someday, manipulate human behavior 
in order to achieve what they take to be good consequentialist 
outcomes. Assuming that the compliance claim is true and that 
we share their goals, Robinson and Darley describe a plausible 
way of being a good consequentialist. 
Notice that empirical desert advocates do not seem to be 
claiming that widely-shared desert intuitions serve in any 
direct way to justify our practices. Given their self-professed 
commitment to consequentialism, at some level, they 
presumably believe that our desert intuitions are mistaken (or 
at least that they fail to serve as a sufficient justification for 
punishment). Otherwise, it is not clear why they are 
consequentialists. If Robinson and Darley can provide any 
justification for their use of widely-shared intuitions, they can 
do so by claiming that these intuitions enable them to make 
predictions about compliance that further their underlying 
consequentialist approach to punishment. Their 
consequentialist commitments presumably have some other 
justification that is independent of the intuitions they study 
empirically.  
B. Three Challenges 
According to traditional principles of justification, the 
rightness or wrongness of an action is independent of people’s 
beliefs about the action’s moral status.20 The mere fact that a 
person believes that some action is morally permissible or 
impermissible is irrelevant to its moral status unless we have 
some further reason to think that the person’s belief is likely to 
be correct. So the naked moral intuitions that social scientists 
elicit have little normative force unless they fit together in 
some framework that justifies those intuitions. Merely 
  
 19 Robinson & Darley, Utility of Desert, supra note 11, at 456. 
 20 Cf. Mary Sigler, The False Promise of Empirical Desert, in CRIMINAL LAW 
CONVERSATIONS, supra note 7, at 39, 39 (stating that deontological desert is 
“[c]onceptually indifferent to people’s intuitions about justice”); Christopher Slobogin, 
Is Justice Just Us? Using Social Science to Inform Substantive Criminal Law, 87 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 315, 324 (1996) (“[E]ven knowledge that the community 
resoundingly disfavors a particular legal formulation should usually be irrelevant to 
deserts analysis.”). 
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averaging the intuitions of lots of people will not justify the 
intuitions. By way of rough analogy, when deciding what color 
to paint an apartment, you might be persuaded by the reasons 
suggesting blue or the reasons suggesting red. But it would be 
silly to simply average the wavelengths of red and blue and 
paint the apartment yellow, as there may be no reasons at all 
to support that approach.  
Similarly, merely aggregating people’s punishment 
intuitions tells us little, if anything, about the deontological 
justification for crafting policies consistent with those 
intuitions. After all, people’s lay intuitions can be wrong. So 
Robinson and Darley must be careful not to suggest that 
people’s aggregated intuitions provide (non-consequentialist) 
justifications for punishment. Unfortunately, prominent 
explications of empirical desert sometimes blur the distinction 
between prediction and justification. In the next section, I will 
argue that, although empirical desert principally operates in 
the predictive mode, it picks-and-chooses from among our 
intuitions in ways that seem to slip into the justificatory mode.  
1. Cherry-Picking Challenge 
Empirical desert advocates frequently claim to capture 
laypeople’s “intuitions of justice.”21 Indeed, much of the 
rhetorical appeal of empirical desert is that it purports to 
capture such intuitions. According to the cherry-picking 
challenge, however, it is more accurate to say that empirical 
desert seeks to capture only particular aspects of our 
punishment intuitions. 
Such selectivity would be perfectly appropriate if only 
certain intuitions can be used to promote compliance. But 
empirical desert advocates have yet to show why the particular 
intuitions they examine are the ones most likely to help us 
improve compliance. Rather, they often screen out certain 
intuitions in ways that seem designed to promote more 
deontologically-justified policies. In so doing, they seem to shift 
into a justificatory mode that imports non-consequentialist 
values and undermines empirical desert’s consequentialist 
foundations.  
  
 21 See, e.g., Robinson & Darley, Intuitions of Justice, supra note 1. The 
expression is also used in the title of Robinson & Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict, 
supra note 1. 
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The first way that Robinson and Darley pick-and-choose 
pertinent intuitions is by focusing on intuitions elicited at a 
certain level of particularity. They explore lay intuitions using 
brief hypothetical scenarios that contain a few facts about a 
fictitious crime and then ask people to assess a perpetrator’s 
level of blame.22 Such intuitions, posed at this intermediate 
level of abstraction, do tend to reflect retributive sentiments. 
But we could also query people’s intuitions at a more 
abstract level. As Kevin Carlsmith has noted, even if people’s 
intuitions about appropriate punishment in particular cases 
tend to be better explained by retributive notions of 
punishment, when asked about the general goals of a 
punishment system, laypeople frequently list consequentialist 
aims like deterrence and incapacitation.23 We can reasonably 
conclude from such findings that people’s intuitions of justice 
support consequentialism in some ways and retributivism in 
others. People’s intuitions of justice are not univocally 
retributive. 
Nevertheless, Robinson and Darley focus on the 
intuitions laypeople express when engaging in acts of mock 
sentencing while mostly ignoring their intuitions when 
contemplating the broader goals of sentencing. Though we have 
consequentialist intuitions about the broad purposes of 
punishment,24 Robinson and Darley would permit few 
exceptions to desert-based punishment distributions.25 Thus, 
rather than systematically gathering up widely-shared 
  
 22 Here is a sample scenario: 
John is knocked down from behind by a man with a knife who moves to stab 
him. As the man lunges for him, John stabs him with a piece of glass he finds 
on the ground, which is the only thing he can do to save himself from being 
killed. The man later dies of his injuries. 
Robinson & Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict, supra note 1, at 1894. For other 
examples, see id. at 1894-1900, 1902-04; PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, 
JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME: COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 229-81 
(1995). 
 23 Carlsmith, On Justifying Punishment, supra note 5, at 134-36; Robinson, 
Empirical Desert, supra note 7, at 35 (noting that subjects “explicitly endorse 
deterrence justifications for punishment,” even though “they actually meted out 
sentences” in surveys using desert-related criteria); see also Jonathan Baron & Ilana 
Ritov, The Role of Probability of Detection in Judgments of Probability, 1 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 553, 582 (2009) (noting that “[p]robes designed to encourage subjects to think 
about deterrence” increased, to a small extent, subjects’ willingness to use 
consequentialist considerations to mete out punishment). 
 24 Robinson & Darley, Utility of Desert, supra note 11, at 494-97. 
 25 Id. at 454 (stating that we “ought to assign criminal punishments on 
essentially just desert grounds”). 
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intuitions and incorporating them into criminal justice policy, 
they engage in a further step, deciding whether some 
particular widely-shared intuition is too abstract to promote 
compliance. 
Robinson and Darley would presumably say that 
intuitions elicited by mock sentencing are more important for 
generating future compliance than are our more abstract 
intuitions about the broader goals of sentencing. That certainly 
might be true. But it is itself an empirical question. When a 
former rapist is released from prison and subsequently 
reoffends, people’s incapacitationist views about prison might 
lead them to doubt the appropriateness of existing sentencing 
policies. 
Empirical desert advocates might be accused not only of 
ignoring intuitions that are too abstract but also of ignoring 
intuitions that are too particularized. For example, Robinson 
states that empirical desert “envisions a set of liability and 
punishment rules to be applied identically to all defendants; it 
is not the community’s view of deserved punishment in a 
particular case that is relevant here.”26 So, it seems, we ought 
not develop empirical desert policies by examining reactions to 
major public events, like the O.J. Simpson trial or the beating 
of Rodney King. Robinson justifies this limitation, in part, by 
noting that researchers must control the relevant information 
that subjects have about a particular case. We cannot 
meaningfully compare moral intuitions about some case when 
people have different information about its underlying facts.27  
But Robinson also poses case scenarios as he does in 
order to reduce biased responses. Thus, the second way in 
which empirical desert advocates pick-and-choose among our 
intuitions is by screening out intuitions that are biased by 
factors like racism: 
[I]n collecting data to construct the rules, real cases, especially 
publicly known cases, typically are not a useful source. People’s 
  
 26 Robinson, Competing Conceptions, supra note 13, at 149.  
 27 Robinson states:  
What one makes of the police testimony in the O.J. Simpson case or the 
Rodney King case may depend upon how one has come to view police officers 
from one’s daily life experiences. If people draw different conclusions from the 
testimony, they are likely to have different views of the relevant facts, which 
predictably results in different views on the liability and punishment 
deserved. 
Robinson, Empirical Desert, supra note 7, at 34. 
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views on such cases are commonly biased by political or social 
context or by other factors such as race, that all would agree have no 
proper role in setting principles of justice. Instead, the community’s 
intuitions of justice are derived from controlled social science studies 
that determine the factors that influence people’s assessment of a 
violator’s blameworthiness, not by asking people about abstract 
factors but rather by having them “sentence” a variety of carefully 
constructed variations of cases to see what factors influence their 
punishment judgments.28  
If Robinson truly is a consequentialist, however, then he 
dismisses the effects of racial bias too quickly. From a 
predictive perspective, racially biased intuitions may tell us a 
lot about people’s compliance with the law. People who have 
such intuitions are likely to question the law’s legitimacy when 
it lacks their biases. Surely such intuitions provide relevant 
data from a predictive perspective. 
Robinson’s decision to ignore racist intuitions seems 
only to make sense if he is using intuitions to justify 
punishment policies. In that case, we would all agree with 
Robinson that racist intuitions “have no proper role in setting 
principles of justice.”29 By filtering out biased intuitions on the 
ground that they cannot be morally justified, however, he 
seems to shift illicitly from the predictive mode to the 
justificatory mode.  
When we move away from racism to other sorts of 
biases, the level of abstraction at which we should elicit 
intuitions becomes even more controversial. Robinson states 
that “political or social context” can bias our intuitions, but 
surely some political or social context can be relevant to 
determining what practices are just. More importantly, once we 
start to examine the substance of our intuitions to determine 
whether or not they should play a role in setting principles of 
justice according to what seem to be non-consequentialist 
moral criteria, then we should apply those criteria from top-to-
bottom, analyzing the justifiability of all of our punishment-
related intuitions. Doing so would make empirical desert quite 
a bit more complicated than it currently purports to be.  
Robinson could stay safely in the predictive mode by 
asserting that intuitions laden with racial, political, or social 
biases are not likely to promote compliance. The assertion 
might even be true in the long run, though it would require 
  
 28 Robinson, Competing Conceptions, supra note 13, at 149 (emphasis added).  
 29 Id. 
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empirical support and further delineation of what is meant by 
political and social context. In the short term, at least, laws 
designed to eliminate biases are likely to generate non-
compliance among those with the biases. So, it is not clear how 
Robinson can ignore such intuitions in the predictive mode. If 
Robinson screens out racially, politically, and socially biased 
intuitions on consequentialist grounds, then he should do so 
more explicitly. Otherwise, empirical desert seems to hover in a 
gray area that sometimes focuses on intuitions for predictive 
reasons and sometimes focuses on them for justificatory 
reasons.30 
The third way defenders of empirical desert pick-and-
choose among our intuitions is by setting the conditions under 
which the intuitions are elicited. Robinson and Darley 
purposefully sanitize the circumstances under which we gather 
empirical desert data in order to discourage answers that 
reflect heat-of-the-moment reactions. According to Robinson 
and Darley:  
Basing the criminal law on community standards does not mean 
resolving individual cases as the public or press see them in the heat 
of the moment. We know that the public and the press can lose 
perspective when buffeted by the biases and prejudices inspired by 
the facts of any particular case. The tendency of people to be more 
sympathetic to defendants more like themselves is well documented. 
Nor does our position support legislators’ hastily passing laws driven 
by public reactions to some recent court case that outrages public 
opinion.31 
Again, Robinson and Darley seem to be slipping into a 
justificatory mode. They want us to focus on punishment 
intuitions gathered in a calmer state. But if they believe that 
we must focus on such intuitions because they are more likely 
to be just in some transcendent deontological sense, then they 
have indeed slipped into a justificatory mode that seems to 
depart from their otherwise purely consequentialist argument 
for empirical desert. In that case, it seems once again that we 
  
 30 There certainly are a variety of consequentialist grounds for opposing 
racism and other forms of bias. So, Robinson could object to creating biased laws on 
consequentialist grounds other than just compliance. But as a consequentialist, it 
would seem better to first measure people’s biased intuitions. Then, we would know 
more about the costs of passing laws that ignore people’s firmly-held biases, even if 
unbiased laws have more benefits overall.  
 31 Robinson & Darley, Utility of Desert, supra note 11, at 488 (footnote 
omitted).  
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may as well delve deeper into the substance of the intuitions at 
stake in order to determine if the intuitions are justified.  
Alternatively, Robinson and Darley may discount 
biased, unreflective intuitions because they believe that a 
criminal justice system based on such intuitions will not 
maximally promote long-run compliance. Such a view would 
remain safely in the predictive mode. Unfortunately, it’s not 
clear that it’s true. Real world cases will generate precisely the 
sorts of outrage, bias, and prejudice that Robinson and Darley 
seek to exclude when they elicit our intuitions at the 
experimental stage. Indeed, researchers have found that 
subjects give more punitive responses to questions about 
punishment when they are angered than when they are calm.32 
When people decide whether or not to violate the law, they are 
frequently in states of anger; so from a predictive perspective, 
we might generate better information about compliance 
behavior by querying angry subjects. Nevertheless, Robinson 
and Darley choose to query subjects in calm states, presumably 
because calmer intuitions are somehow more justifiable than 
angrier intuitions.  
The choice of survey conditions can substantially affect 
survey responses. When primed with disgusting odors or video 
clips, subjects find hypothetical bad acts, like lying on a 
resume, more morally wrong.33 By contrast, subjects primed 
with words associated with purity and cleanliness give less 
severe ratings of wrongfulness.34 The effect of disgusting stimuli 
on wrongfulness ratings can be reduced, however, if subjects 
are made to wash their hands after exposure to disgusting 
stimuli.35 When empirical desert researchers elicit intuitions, 
they need to decide whether to do so with subjects that are 
angry, calm, disgusted, or comfortable, with hands that have 
recently been washed or not. Those choices must be justified, 
  
 32 See Jennifer S. Lerner, Julie H. Goldberg & Philip E. Tetlock, Sober 
Second Thought: The Effects of Accountability, Anger, and Authoritarianism on 
Attributions of Responsibility, 24 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 563, 568 (1998). 
 33 See generally Simone Schnall et al., Disgust as Embodied Moral Judgment, 
34 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1096 (2008). For other examples of how our 
moral intuitions vary based on context, see Donald Braman, Dan M. Kahan & David 
Hoffman, Some Realism About Punishment Naturalism, 77 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
(forthcoming, 2010) (manuscript at 17-55, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1443552). 
 34 Simone Schnall, Jennifer Benton & Sophie Harvey, With a Clean 
Conscience: Cleanliness Reduces the Severity of Moral Judgments, 19 PSYCHOL. SCI. 
1219, 1219-20 (2008). 
 35 Id. at 1220-22. 
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presumably on the grounds that some survey conditions will 
provide better information about how to increase compliance.  
I am not criticizing any of the particular choices made 
by empirical desert advocates when querying lay intuitions. 
Rather, I am highlighting the many ways in which the 
selection of survey questions and conditions will affect survey 
results. In order to stay true to their consequentialist 
underpinnings, empirical desert advocates should do more to 
bolster the consequentialist grounds for their choices of survey 
questions and conditions.36  
Finally, empirical desert advocates make implicit 
decisions about whose intuitions to examine. If we were seeking 
to identify punishment intuitions generally, we could query a 
random sample of the population. But Robinson and Darley 
seek to gather information to boost compliance. A random 
sample of the population will contain relatively few people who 
are on the fence between offending and not offending, at least 
with respect to offenses of any seriousness. Making the law 
consistent with the intuitions of a random sample of survey-
takers in the population is unlikely to generate much 
compliance because most people in the sample would be 
unlikely to violate serious criminal laws in the first place.37 
If Robinson and Darley were truly interested in 
reducing crime, they should focus their inquiries on those who 
are most likely to be on the fence with respect to compliance. 
Many of those who actually commit crimes are mentally ill or 
addicted to drugs, so perhaps Robinson and Darley should 
focus on these populations. I suspect they do not, however, 
because though they purport to gather intuitions for predictive 
  
 36 Even if people have widely-shared intuitions of ordinal punishment 
severity under a variety of conditions of elicitation, empirical desert purports to 
address a much wider range of intuitions. As to these other intuitions, they will often 
depend on the conditions of elicitation. 
 37 Robinson and colleagues are also concerned with more modest forms of 
subversion, as when jurors ignore a judge’s instructions or when police officers do not 
follow proper procedures. See Paul H. Robinson, Geoffrey P. Goodwin & Michael Reisig, 
The Disutility of Injustice 42 (Sept. 13, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1470905) [hereinafter Robinson et 
al., Disutility of Injustice]. If this is the sort of subversion that empirical desert 
advocates hope to reduce, it is hardly clear that the goal can justify revolutionizing our 
punishment practices. It’s one thing if empirical desert reduces crimes like murder, 
rape, and burglary but quite another if it merely increases compliance with police 
procedures and jury instructions. Furthermore, while we generally seek to encourage 
compliance with such behavioral norms, it is hardly clear that society functions better 
whenever subversion is reduced. Most consequentialists, I suspect, would seek to 
optimize rather than minimize rates of subversion.  
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purposes, in fact, they limit the scope of intuitions gathered to 
those that are elicited from only certain people under certain 
conditions that are likely to seem morally justified. 
To be clear, I am not arguing that empirical desert 
advocates should query angry, biased, or drug-addicted 
subjects. Rather, I claim that advocates must defend their 
choices. If they defend them in the predictive mode, then they 
should present empirical data showing that laws that square 
with calmer, unbiased intuitions generate more compliance 
than laws that square with intuitions elicited under other 
circumstances.38 Alternatively, if advocates defend their 
selection of intuitions in the justificatory mode (which seems 
doubtful), then they should explain why we filter out only some 
intuitions that are unjustified but stop short of examining the 
justification of lay intuitions from top to bottom, including the 
lay intuition that people should be punished to obtain 
retribution. 
Empirical desert advocates clearly recognize the 
distinction between using intuitions to predict and to justify.39 
Robinson explicitly states that “[e]mpirical desert can only tell 
us what people think is just. It cannot tell us what actually is 
just. In other words, it cannot tell us what an actor 
‘deontologically deserves.’”40 The challenge, though, in 
responding to the cherry-picking challenge is to make clear 
that interests in justifying punishment do not accidentally 
sneak in to the methodology.  
2. Significance Challenge 
Empirical desert advocates are self-avowed 
consequentialists.41 As consequentialists, they believe that 
punishment is justified by its instrumental ability to achieve 
good ends like crime prevention and prisoner rehabilitation. 
They care not just about achieving these goals but also about 
  
 38 Of course, if we had good data on how particular laws affect compliance, we 
might observe regularities in the data without needing surveys of lay intuitions at all. 
In a world with better data on the relationship between laws and compliance, empirical 
desert would likely prove most helpful as a method of generating hypotheses as to 
which new laws to test first. 
 39 Robinson, Empirical Desert, supra note 7, at 37. 
 40 Id. 
 41 See Robinson & Darley, Utility of Desert, supra note 11, at 456 (stating 
that their “arguments for a desert-based system are blatantly utilitarian.”); id. (“We 
give . . . a utilitarian justification for the only non-utilitarian system for allocating 
punishment.”). 
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doing so in a cost-effective manner.42 So, ultimately, empirical 
desert advocates will have to present evidence, not just that 
they can increase compliance, but that they can do so in a 
manner that best promotes all consequentialist goals. The 
significance challenge says that unless we can estimate how 
much compliance we will generate by adopting a policy 
consistent with empirical desert, we won’t know if the policy 
warrants deviating from our ordinary consequentialist policies.  
One problem is that, unless we know how much 
compliance some empirical desert policy will generate, we 
cannot choose among various competitor policies. To take one 
important example discussed earlier, Robinson and Darley 
make much of the fact that people have remarkably consistent 
intuitions about the comparative blameworthiness of offenses, 
at least among core crimes “of physical aggression, 
unconsented-to takings, and deception or deceit in exchanges.”43 
Thus, they note, for a wide range of crimes, we have 
surprisingly consistent intuitions about their appropriate 
ordinal punishment severity (the ranking of punishment 
magnitudes for different crimes).44 
When it comes to crafting actual policy, however, the 
significance of this finding may be swamped by another set of 
punishment intuitions about which laypeople have wide-
ranging intuitions. Namely, surveys show that people have 
quite varied intuitions about the absolute amount of 
punishment that offenders should receive for committing a 
particular offense.45 Given the inconsistency in our intuitions of 
cardinal punishment severity, it is not surprising that 
jurisdictions vary considerably in the length of prison 
sentences they assign to various crimes. Robinson and Kurzban 
note that “American offenders were required to serve an 
  
 42 See ANTONY DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS 156-57 (1986) (describing 
essential features of consequentialist punishment). 
 43 Robinson & Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict, supra note 1, at 1880; 
Robinson & Darley, Intuitions of Justice, supra note 1, at 57. 
 44 Empirical desert advocates may overstate the salience of this finding. See 
Braman, Kahan & Hoffman, supra note 33, at 17-20 (arguing that people have 
divergent punishment intuitions about “victimless” or “vice” crimes and that “the 
incidence of these crimes greatly outnumbers the incidence of criminal victimizations”). 
 45 See Robinson et al., Disutility of Justice, supra note 37, at 16 (“While 
people tend to agree on the proper rank order of cases on the punishment continuum, 
at least for the kind of core harms at issue here, some people tend to be harsh in their 
‘sentencing,’ while others are lenient.”); Robinson & Kurzban, Concordance and 
Conflict, supra note 1, at 1880-82; Robinson & Darley, Intuitions of Justice, supra note 
1, at 9. 
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average of twenty-nine months after conviction in 1999,” while 
“the average offender in the Netherlands was released after 
five months.”46 Meanwhile, the average Columbian offender was 
“not released until a startling 140 months”47 after conviction. 
Even if we can increase compliance to some extent by 
making ordinal punishment severity line up with widely-
shared intuitions, the compliance bonus we generate might be 
small relative to the loss of compliance generated when the 
cardinal severity of our punishments is out of line with people’s 
intuitions. Indeed, it seems unlikely that a person will care 
very much if the penalty for grand theft is a little higher or 
lower than the penalty for a minor battery if penalties for all 
offenses are an order of magnitude higher or lower than where 
he thinks they should be.48 Moreover, people are more likely to 
learn about the absolute magnitude of a punishment in the 
media than they are to learn about a punishment’s severity 
relative to the punishment for other crimes.49 
Robinson argues that our punishments should line up 
with widely-shared ordinal punishment intuitions. An 
alternative strategy, however, is to make our punishments line 
up, to the extent possible, with everyone’s not-widely-shared 
absolute punishment intuitions. Whichever strategy is better 
can only be determined by having some sense of how deviations 
from ordinal punishment intuitions affect compliance relative 
to deviations from cardinal punishment intuitions, something 
we cannot assess well from social science surveys of people’s 
intuitions. Similarly, empirical desert policies that require us 
to spend additional resources are only warranted if they 
promote compliance better than alternative policies, like 
  
 46 Robinson & Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict, supra note 1, at 1882. 
 47 Id.  
 48 See Sigler, supra note 7, at 40 (recognizing that we care about absolute 
proportionality at least as much, if not more so, than relative proportionality). 
 49 See Robinson et al., Disutility of Injustice, supra note 37, at 50 n.158 
(“[M]edia tend[] to focus on the absolute amount of punishment imposed rather than 
upon the relative amount of punishment among different cases.”); see also id. at 32 (“It 
is often the case that voters are only informed about the duration of sentences assigned 
in specific cases . . . .”); id. at 32-33 (“[M]ost of the crime stories in newspapers are 
relatively brief and commonly report the sentence given, but generally omit or gloss 
over the reasoning that lies behind the assigned sentences.”); id. at 33 (“It appears 
likely that media accounts of crimes are the source that voters generally use to form 
their judgments on courtroom sentencing.”). More generally, empirical desert is likely 
to have little impact on compliance if laypeople are not even exposed to information 
about how the law deviates from their intuitions. See Slobogin, supra note 20, at 326. 
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training or hiring police officers to promote better partnerships 
with communities.50  
A second problem is that even if we could decide which 
empirical desert strategy would best promote compliance, we 
would have no grounds for implementing it, unless it fits well 
in a consequentialist calculus.51 Suppose, for example, that we 
can make our punishments more consistent with empirical 
desert by raising the typical sentence for some offense by one 
year. Unless we can estimate the amount of compliance we are 
likely to gain, we won’t know if the compliance benefit 
outweighs the cost of incarcerating offenders for the additional 
year. Similarly, if we can make our punishments more 
consistent with empirical desert by reducing the typical 
sentence for some offense by one year, we won’t know if the 
compliance benefit outweighs the loss of incapacitation and 
rehabilitation we would have had if we maintained the status 
quo policy. These sorts of determinations are difficult to make 
absent data about induced compliance. 
Robinson recognizes that empirical desert cannot tell 
the whole story about appropriate punishment. He notes, for 
example, that a deviation from empirical desert “might so 
clearly provide a crime-control bonanza that any crimogenic 
effect from undermining the system’s moral credibility would 
be outweighed by the deviation’s crime-control benefits.”52 But 
he treats such occasions as highly exceptional, claiming that we 
“ought to assign criminal punishments on essentially just 
desert grounds.”53 In other words, Robinson defends the 
unconstrained adoption of empirical desert so long as we are 
open-minded about occasional deviations. But if empirical 
desert adds just a modest compliance bonus, we are not 
justified in adopting it wholesale, unless we understand its 
effects relative to other consequentialist goals.  
Robinson recognizes that “our current knowledge 
regarding [the crime-control benefits of empirical desert] is 
  
 50 See Slobogin, supra note 20, at 326 (noting that compliance may depend on 
respect for those with legal authority, as well as the laws they enforce). 
 51 See Simons, supra note 18, at 641 (stating that it is unclear if the benefits 
of empirical desert “are sufficiently large to outweigh the utilitarian costs of securing 
correspondence between community values about just deserts and the content of the 
criminal law”); see also id. at 661. 
 52 Robinson, Empirical Desert, supra note 7, at 38. 
 53 Robinson & Darley, Utility of Desert, supra note 11, at 454; see also id. at 
498 (“We conclude that desert distribution of liability happens to be the distribution 
that has the greatest utility, in the sense of avoiding crime. Thus, utility theorists 
ought to support liabilities assigned according to such a desert-based system.”). 
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limited and that more research would be extremely valuable.”54 
Nevertheless, he does “not believe that we need wait for [the 
research] before preferring empirical desert” to its 
competitors.55 According to Robinson, empirical desert “can be 
readily operationalized—its rules and principles can be 
authoritatively determined through social science research into 
peoples’ shared intuitions of justice.”56  
On the contrary, however, we cannot use social science 
surveys alone to determine how much compliance empirical 
desert will generate. To do that, we would have to engage in 
the very difficult process of monitoring and analyzing the 
effects that empirical desert policies have on compliance 
behavior. We can use surveys to test short-term effects of 
people’s beliefs about the law on their reported willingness to 
comply with the law. But such studies will still be a far cry 
from delivering the sort of real-world data we would need in 
order to estimate compliance induced by real-world empirical 
desert policies. Therefore, we cannot operationalize empirical 
desert as part of a consequentialist punishment system until 
we can better estimate how much compliance empirical desert 
policies induce.57 
  
 54 Paul H. Robinson, Reply, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS, supra note 7, 
at 61, 63 [hereinafter Robinson, Reply]. 
 55 Id. But cf. Michael T. Cahill, A Fertile Desert?, in CRIMINAL LAW 
CONVERSATIONS, supra note 7, at 43, 43-44 (raising questions about the ability of 
empirical desert to generate compliance). 
 56 Robinson, Empirical Desert, supra note 7, at 29. 
 57 As this article neared publication, Robinson and colleagues released a draft 
paper that provides some evidence about how exposure to policies that deviate from lay 
intuitions may affect behavior. See Robinson et al., Disutility of Injustice, supra note 
37. They studied subjects who were asked to envision themselves living in a 
hypothetical jurisdiction that handed down several sentences that sharply diverge from 
lay intuitions. The sentencing decisions said to be from the hypothetical jurisdiction 
were, in fact, aggregated from real U.S. jurisdictions, and subjects were so informed. 
Id. at 45, 48. The researchers found that exposure to the sentencing information led 
subjects to report a higher likelihood of disobeying certain behavioral norms (not 
necessarily criminal law violations) in the hypothetical jurisdiction. Id. at 50. 
  While the research is a step in the right direction, it does not come close to 
providing sufficient reason to implement empirical desert and certainly does not enable 
us to operationalize it. I will briefly mention just three reasons why. First, the research 
focuses principally on subversive rather than criminal behavior, and it is far from clear 
that subversive behavior should be minimized rather than optimized. Second, we do 
not know how closely survey responses reflect actual behaviors. We are understandably 
skeptical that short-term exposure to genuine information about sentencing will have 
much of a long-term effect on compliance. After all, if such short-term exposure really 
increased people’s likelihood of violating behavioral norms, we might be troubled by the 
conduct of the research itself or at least require greater precautions to undo its 
deleterious effects (given that the research acknowledged using actual U.S. cases). 
Third, in the real world, many people have even less exposure to sentencing 
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Robinson argues that empirical desert can be 
operationalized at least as easily as its competitors.58 But 
empirical desert is a form of consequentialism. So empirical 
desert cannot be operationalized if consequentialism cannot. 
Even if increasing some penalty will generate compliance by 
making the penalty better align with widely-shared intuitions, 
we cannot say that the higher penalty is cost effective unless 
we have some sense of how much compliance the increased 
penalty will generate. There may be narrow circumstances 
where empirical desert can be helpful even with limited 
information, but wholesale adoption of empirical desert 
principles requires much more data on induced compliance. 
The bottom line is that if empirical desert truly is a 
form of consequentialism, then it has to address a variety of 
consequentialist punishment goals. To do that, it must yield 
predictions about the magnitude of compliance some policy can 
be expected to induce, so we can compare that effect to other 
expected consequences of the policy. The significance challenge 
emphasizes that until empirical desert advocates can better 
quantify the effects on compliance of conforming to or deviating 
from widely-shared intuitions, we will know little about how 
much impact widely-shared intuitions should have on our 
consequentialist punishment policies and whether empirical 
desert should be a guiding light or just an important, though 
somewhat nebulous, factor to consider.  
3. Exploitation Challenge 
Even though empirical desert seems best understood as 
a consequentialist approach to punishment, Robinson has tried 
to make empirical desert appeal to retributivists, too. 
According to Robinson, retributivists may find that “empirical 
desert will produce far more deontological desert than any 
other workable principle that could or would be adopted.”59 Yet, 
  
information than did the study subjects and are unlikely to be exposed to so many 
cases with outcomes that diverge so substantially from lay intuitions. Deviations from 
lay intuitions cannot reduce compliance unless people are consciously or unconsciously 
exposed to information that reveals the deviations. 
 58 Robinson, Reply, supra note 54, at 63. 
 59 Robinson, Empirical Desert, supra note 7, at 29. Elsewhere, Robinson has 
made the pitch more modestly: “The best that can be said about it deontologically is 
that [empirical desert] may produce something less in conflict with deontological desert 
than would the more traditional instrumentalist distributive principles, such as 
general deterrence, incapacitation of the dangerous, or rehabilitation.” Robinson, 
Reply, supra note 54, at 61. 
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I suspect that many retributivists would take issue with this 
claim. They may say that if you purposely or knowingly punish 
in excess of true deontological desert, you are not producing a 
lot of retributive justice; you are producing no justice at all. 
Moreover, if appropriate punishment requires us to punish 
people for deontological reasons, then an empirical desert 
punisher, motivated by consequentialist principles, may be 
imposing no deontological desert whatsoever. 
But even if retributivists are sympathetic to Robinson’s 
claim about the amount of deontological desert created by 
empirical desert, I raise here a different challenge. Namely, 
retributivists may be concerned that empirical desert seeks to 
gain compliance from the general public by exploiting 
laypeople’s desert intuitions in order to achieve 
consequentialist ends. According to this exploitation concern, 
empirical desert advocates are accommodating the preferences 
of laypeople, not because they believe that laypeople are likely 
to know what punishments are just but rather because 
empirical desert advocates can take advantage of laypeople’s 
beliefs in order to distribute punishment according to what 
empirical desert advocates take to be the real 
(consequentialist) principles of punishment. 
The exploitation concern arises from the fact that 
empirical desert only induces compliance when laypeople make 
a certain questionable inference. According to Robinson and 
Darley, “citizens in general regard the law as a credible guide 
to how they ought to behave.”60 In borderline cases, “community 
members are more likely to give deference to the commands of 
the criminal justice system if the system is morally 
authoritative.”61 But does empirical desert lead to more morally 
authoritative laws in the eyes of laypeople? If Robinson and 
Darley are right that people understand what is “morally 
authoritative” in retributive terms, the answer is no. As 
Robinson states, empirical desert “cannot tell us what an actor 
‘deontologically deserves.’”62 So, whether laypeople are 
conscious of it or not, the compliance induced by empirical 
desert happens through an irrational or non-rational process. 
There is no good reason why empirical desert should induce 
  
 60 Robinson & Darley, Intuitions of Justice, supra note 1, at 30. 
 61 Id. at 29. 
 62 Robinson, Empirical Desert, supra note 7, at 37. 
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compliance among laypeople if they are true retributivists.63 
Retributivists should not be swayed by aggregate data about 
other people’s intuitions unless they have reasons to trust 
other people’s views about justice more than their own. By 
crafting policies with the aura of deontological legitimacy in 
order to take advantage of an irrational or non-rational 
cognitive process, empirical desert is arguably exploitative. 
If you have consequentialist leanings, you are not likely 
to be troubled by the exploitation concern. There are two 
reasons, however, why such exploitation raises problems for 
empirical desert. The first is that exploitation may itself offend 
principles of legitimate government. Some theorists, especially 
the deontologically-minded retributivists to whom Robinson 
appeals, may find it inappropriate for the government to obtain 
undeniably good results if it must do so through misleading 
processes.  
To illustrate, suppose that public health bureaucrats 
determine that we can ease people’s back pain by providing 
free “medical” bracelets. The bracelets have no special 
properties but have been found to ease chronic suffering 
through a placebo effect. May we distribute the bracelets along 
with misleading information that the “medical” bracelets heal 
back pain? On the one hand, the bracelets really do relieve pain 
quite inexpensively and that’s a great public good. On the other 
hand, the bracelets achieve the beneficial effect by creating the 
impression that they have pharmacologically-active properties. 
If we told people that the bracelets were quite ordinary, they 
would not work as well. 
  
 63 In this section, I take at face value Robinson and Darley’s claim that 
laypeople have retributive punishment intuitions. To the extent that they, in fact, have 
consequentialist punishment intuitions or only have limited retributive intuitions, then 
they may have quite rational motivations for endorsing empirical desert. For example, 
it is quite possible that laypeople have clear retributive views about particular 
instances of punishment but not about how we should justify punishment more 
generally. If so, policies consistent with empirical desert would not run counter to 
laypeople’s underlying beliefs about justification, and the exploitation concern would be 
weak or non-existent.  
  While it is not clear if laypeople care about the underlying justification of 
our punishment policies, Robinson at least suggests that laypeople care about more 
than just the magnitude of sentences we impose. See Robinson et al., Disutility of 
Justice, supra note 37, at 50-51 (“[W]hat we know about making and keeping 
reputations tells us that the [criminal justice] system’s intention regarding doing 
justice counts enormously. While accidental or unavoidable injustices or failures of 
justice may be forgiven, if the system seems committed to trying to do justice, when 
revealed deviations from desert are intended by the system . . . then even a single 
telling case can have detrimental consequences.”). 
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Empirical desert may function like the placebo 
bracelets. If empirical desert works, it achieves an indisputable 
public good—the reduction of crime. But it achieves the public 
good by creating the impression that the criminal law has the 
sort of deontological legitimacy that laypeople purportedly 
desire. So, one might argue, empirical desert exploits people’s 
perceptions of the law’s legitimacy to accomplish a goal that is 
inconsistent in certain ways with their underlying intuitions of 
justice.64 
Perhaps such exploitation is justified on 
consequentialist grounds. Maybe we are permitted to be less 
than forthcoming in order to obtain good effects. But to the 
extent that empirical desert advocates seek to appeal to 
deontologically-minded retributivists, they have to explain 
what justifies such exploitation according to deontological, not 
consequentialist, principles. 
A second reason why the exploitation concern may be 
problematic is that it has the potential to undermine empirical 
desert itself. If empirical desert induces compliance through an 
irrational or non-rational process, the connection may not 
stand up to public scrutiny. For example, Robinson and Darley 
state that “[w]ithout knowing quite why insider trading is 
morally wrong, most of us accept the conclusion that it is 
wrong, because the relevant authorities have thought about it, 
and assert it is wrong.”65 But if laypeople are retributively-
minded as Robinson and Darley say they are, laypeople 
presumably believe that the relevant authorities punish insider 
trading because it deserves punishment and not because 
punishing insider trading has good consequences. Yet if 
Robinson and Darley have their way, the relevant authorities 
would ultimately punish insider trading because doing so has 
good consequences. Such an approach, one suspects, may not 
sit well with retributively-minded laypeople. 
A layperson may complain, “I thought you punished my 
loved one for insider trading because there was something 
morally wrong with his behavior. Now, however, I see what 
really happened: you found some sociological surveys showing 
  
 64 As Ken Simons has argued, it follows from the views of Robinson and 
Darley that the “[g]overnment should, in principle, expend resources to deceive people 
into believing that the system is just (e.g. by suppressing information about injustices) 
if this would be cheaper than expending resources to improve the actual justice of the 
system.” Simons, supra note 18, at 660. 
 65 Robinson & Darley, Intuitions of Justice, supra note 1, at 30. 
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that you can boost compliance with other laws by punishing 
him in accord with people’s uninformed, automatic intuitions.” 
In other words, the very methodology of empirical desert may 
be inconsistent with the way that laypeople believe that 
punishment should be distributed. Empirical desert may be 
partially self-defeating.  
We could ask laypeople if it is better to establish a 
punishment scheme according to empirical desert principles or 
according to traditional retributivist principles. To my 
knowledge, no one has investigated this particular question. 
But given that laypeople are said to have desert-oriented 
intuitions, perhaps they have the intuition that a punishment 
scheme founded on empirical desert is not generally just.  
To more convincingly show that empirical desert truly 
captures intuitions of justice, empirical desert advocates could 
test intuitions related to empirical desert itself.66 If laypeople 
have intuitions that are consistent with empirical desert, then 
we would have little to worry about. But suppose instead that 
laypeople believe that offenders should receive the punishment 
they deserve based on a more timeless conception of desert that 
squares with considered, reflective judgment. If so, we might 
expect laypeople to find unattractive a criminal justice system 
that is overtly based on empirical desert. After all, it’s one 
thing to think that an offender received a particular term of 
incarceration because such was the conclusion of a team of 
criminal justice experts. It’s quite another to think that the 
term of incarceration was determined by averaging the widely-
shared intuitions of people with no specialized knowledge or 
experience with the criminal justice system.67  
  
 66 Robinson denies that we have intuitions about such matters. Robinson 
states, “Kolber imagines that lay persons have intuitions about all sorts of things other 
than deserved punishment, such as the societal goals of punishment.” Robinson, Reply, 
supra note 54, at 62 (emphasis added). Contra Robinson, there is no question that we 
have intuitions about all sorts of issues, including societal goals of punishment. 
Robinson may be right that our views about broad societal goals are overlayed with 
“reasoned judgments,” in ways that make them different than the sorts of intuitions 
that are his central focus. See Robinson & Darley, Intuitions of Justice, supra note 1, at 
4-8. But good consequentialists must still be interested in intuitions that are overlayed 
with reasoned judgments. After all, when a person decides whether or not to break the 
law, his behavior depends not only on his steadfast, automatic intuitions but also on 
his strongly-held, even if more flexible, reasoned judgments. 
 67 Alice Ristroph challenges empirical desert from a different direction. She 
writes that it “seems doubtful that sentencing policies based on the laboratory findings 
of social scientists will be perceived as more legitimate than policies chosen by the 
ordinary democratic process.” Alice Ristroph, The New Desert, in CRIMINAL LAW 
CONVERSATIONS, supra note 7, at 45, 49. Of course, the policies of empirical desert still 
require approval through the democratic process, so Ristroph is presumably suggesting 
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If laypeople would report finding the empirical desert 
approach to punishment less attractive than other methods of 
distributing punishment, then empirical desert counsels us to 
conform the criminal justice system to laypeople’s intuitions. If 
those lay intuitions are contrary to empirical desert, then 
empirical desert counsels us not to use a system of empirical 
desert! 
Robinson rejects this possibility, claiming that laypeople 
do not care about the difference between empirical desert’s 
consequentialist aims and their own deontological aims. 
According to Robinson: 
[F]rom the layperson’s point of view, empirical desert is 
deontological desert, both in its distribution and its motivation. 
[Laypeople] will see no difference between the two. An empirical 
desert distribution of punishment to them is exactly what true 
justice requires. Even if you showed people the empirical studies, 
their reaction is likely to be a so-what shrug. It’s all very nice that 
these psychology studies show that criminal law is doing justice as 
the community sees it, they might say, but what matters to me is 
that the system really is doing justice.68  
Yet, empirical desert is most assuredly not really doing 
justice as the community sees it if the community understands 
justice deontologically. True, laypeople may never come to 
recognize the differences. But if what matters to laypeople is, 
as Robinson says, that “the system really is doing justice,” then 
laypeople may be misled by empirical desert because, as 
discussed, the “desert” aspect of empirical desert is essentially 
a facade. Deontological desert plays no direct justificatory role 
in empirical desert, just as it plays no direct role in traditional 
descriptions of consequentialism.69 
Rather than denying that there is any meaningful 
difference between the lay conception of justice and the 
empirical desert approach, empirical desert advocates could 
just stick to their consequentialist guns. They could simply 
recognize that there is a difference between the lay conception 
of justice and empirical desert but argue that this particular 
  
that a straightforward empirical desert methodology is, in some sense, outside the 
ordinary democratic process. 
 68 Robinson, Reply, supra note 54, at 62. 
 69 There are non-traditional versions of consequentialism, however, that do 
give a more fundamental role to deontological desert, as discussed in MICHAEL MOORE, 
PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 155-59 (1997) and in Michael 
T. Cahill, Retributive Justice in the Real World, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 815, 833-36 
(2007).  
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violation of lay intuitions is unlikely to have much effect on 
compliance. Even if laypeople reject empirical desert as an 
overarching theory of punishment distribution, this particular 
aspect of lay intuitions can, perhaps, be safely ignored. To this 
extent, a “so-what shrug”70 from consequentialists may be 
appropriate.  
But even if the effect on compliance is small, defenders 
of empirical desert may still have reasons to hide empirical 
desert from laypeople. Once one accepts the compliance claim—
the central tenet of empirical desert that people are more likely 
to comply with a criminal justice system that matches their 
intuitions—then, arguably, we can control crime even more 
efficiently if people believe that our system of punishment is 
based on traditional deontological principles rather than the 
consequentialist principles that Robinson and Darley actually 
use to support empirical desert.  
Whatever one thinks about traditional notions of desert, 
we may very well encourage more respect and compliance in a 
community that erroneously believes we use traditional desert 
principles than in a community that believes we use 
consequentialist principles of empirical desert. Admittedly, this 
is an empirical question. However, it closely matches the 
empirical claim that underlies empirical desert, namely, that 
people comply more with a punishment system that comports 
with their moral intuitions. 
To some influential theorists, like Immanuel Kant and 
John Rawls, no acceptable moral theory can advocate its own 
secrecy.71 Such theorists defend a “publicity condition,” which 
requires that a system of morality be based on principles that 
can be announced publicly without thereby undermining those 
same principles.72 Lots of consequentialist theories scrape up 
against the publicity condition,73 but the issue is particularly 
acute for Robinson and Darley because they seem to have 
already endorsed a version of the publicity condition. They 
state that hiding government operations that are perceived as 
unjust “would be hard to do without breaching notions of press 
  
 70 Robinson, Reply, supra note 54, at 62. 
 71 See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE: A PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY 185 
(M. Campbell Smith trans., 1795); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 130, 133 (1971). 
But see HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 489-90 (7th ed., Hackett 1966) 
(1893). 
 72 See generally David Luban, The Publicity Principle, in THE THEORY OF 
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 154 (Robert E. Goodin ed. 1996). 
 73 Id. at 166-68. 
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freedom and government transparency to which liberal 
democracies aspire.”74 Thus, the publicity condition may create 
more trouble for Robinson and Darley than for most 
consequentialists because they seem to endorse non-
consequentialist limitations on methods of obtaining 
compliance. 
I do not believe that concerns about the publicity 
condition are devastating for empirical desert theorists. At 
least certain forms of beneficent deception should be 
permissible.75 Still, empirical desert could strengthen its 
foundations by empirically testing whether laypeople find 
empirical desert itself to be an appealing approach to 
punishment likely to garner their respect and compliance and, 
if not, explaining whether empirical desert endorses a publicity 
condition or is willing to mislead laypeople in order to better 
promote consequentialist goals. Robinson and Darley have 
made a point of arguing that we cannot modify certain widely-
shared lay intuitions without engaging in coercive practices 
that are inconsistent with modern liberal democracies.76 They 
might reasonably be asked whether we are permitted to hide 
the mechanisms of empirical desert or whether doing so 
involves an inappropriate form of exploitation or secrecy. 
CONCLUSION 
I have argued that we can use widely-shared moral 
intuitions to generate predictions about human behavior that 
help achieve public policy goals. When doing so, however, the 
intuitions play no direct role in justifying the policies. When 
empirical desert advocates work within this predictive mode, 
they may effectively support consequentialist goals that they 
have already settled on for other reasons.  
  
 74 Robinson & Darley, Intuitions of Justice, supra note 1, at 2. 
 75 See Adam J. Kolber, A Limited Defense of Clinical Placebo Deception, 26 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 75 (2008) (arguing that we should not categorically prohibit 
physicians from using placebo treatments deceptively); cf. Michael M. Grynbaum, The 
Secret New York Minute: Trains Late by Design, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2009 (stating 
that, according to a policy generally kept secret, trains depart New York City one 
minute later than their publicly-posted departure times to give riders more time to 
board); Authorities: ‘Balloon Boy’ Incident Was A Hoax, CNN.COM, Oct. 18, 2009, 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/10/18/colorado.balloon.investigation/index.html 
(describing how law enforcement officials lied to the media in order to give crime 
suspects the false impression that the police still believed their story). 
 76 See Robinson & Darley, Intuitions of Justice, supra note 1, at 11, 55-56. 
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Despite suggestions to the contrary, empirical desert 
advocates do not attend to intuitions of justice in any grand 
sense. They seek only to capture a subset of our justice-related 
intuitions that are somewhat abstract and taken during calm 
social science surveys rather than our more heated, spur-of-
the-moment punishment intuitions. Empirical desert advocates 
should make clear that there are consequentialist reasons for 
limiting the inquiry into intuitions in this way, otherwise they 
risk slipping into the justificatory mode.  
Even when safely ensconced in the predictive mode, 
empirical desert advocates should recognize that the very acts 
of formulating and promulgating policies have ethical 
implications. If the goals of those policies are more effectively 
achieved by hiding the underlying policies, then empirical 
desert advocates ought to respond to concerns that their 
approach may sometimes recommend violating publicity 
requirements. As a whole, consequentialists are unlikely to be 
troubled by violations of the publicity condition. To the extent 
that empirical desert tries to appeal to theorists of all 
persuasions, however, quite a bit may turn on whether or not 
empirical desert violates the condition.  
The aims of empirical desert are vitally important to 
consequentialist punishment. Lots of policies that may at first 
seem justified by consequentialism are likely not to be when we 
consider how those policies may be at odds with widely-shared 
views of what is fair and just. Any real-world consequentialist 
must take such second-order effects into account. Empirical 
desert is an important attempt to do so, and one that can do so 
even better by distinguishing more clearly between the 
predictive and justificatory uses of widely-shared moral 
intuitions, by gathering more empirical data about the effects 
on compliance of deviating from intuitions, and by responding 
to concerns about exploitation and the publicity condition. 
